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ABSTRACT: We estimate the effects of works councils on productivity, 1997-2000, 
using the IAB Establishment Panel, a nationally representative German data set. 
We recoup the works council effect by estimating translog production functions, 
stochastic frontier production functions, and a model in first differences. Once we 
focus on a core sample of establishments with 21 to 100 employees in which the 
powers of the works council are a datum, it emerges that the positive productivity 
differential found in recent studies is a chimera. By the same token, neither is the 
works council effect negative. This result is important in its own right given the 
sharply opposing findings of past empirical research and the partisan positions 
these have helped sustain. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Anhand des IAB-Betriebspanels, eines repräsentativen 
deutschen Firmendatensatzes, schätzen wir die Produktivitätswirkungen von 
Betriebsräten für den Zeitraum 1997-2000. Wir ermitteln den Betriebsratseffekt 
durch Schätzung von Translog-Produktionsfunktionen und Modellen in ersten 
Differenzen sowie durch stochastische Produktionsrandschätzungen. Wenn wir 
uns auf eine Kernstichprobe von Betrieben mit 21 bis 100 Beschäftigten 
konzentrieren, innerhalb derer die Rechte des Betriebsrats sich nicht ändern, 
erweist sich das in jüngeren Studien gefundene positive Produktivitätsdifferenzial 
als Chimäre. Allerdings fällt der Betriebsratseffekt auch nicht negativ aus. Diese 
Erkenntnis ist angesichts der extrem gegensätzlichen Ergebnisse früherer Studien 
und der darauf aufbauenden konträren Positionen besonders wichtig. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
These are interesting times for German works councils. In the first place, recent 
changes to national legislation – via the 2001 Works Constitution Act – have made 
it easier to establish this form of workplace representation, while at the same time 
enhancing the competence or powers of the entity (see Addison, Bellmann, 
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003). In the second place, with the German system 
clearly in mind, the European Union (EU) has just legislated minimum standards in 
respect of national systems for informing and consulting employees in 
undertakings (establishments) with a minimum of 50 (20) employees (Official 
Journal, 2002). In both cases, the stated reasons for strengthening worker rights 
include an efficiency rationale. As a practical matter, however, rather little is known 
of the effects of information, consultation, and participation on firm/establishment 
performance. (This deficit also characterizes the high performance work practice 
literature more generally.) Indeed, at the time the changes to the German 
legislation were mooted, the Codetermination Commission set up to review the 
operation of the existing codetermination machinery and to make 
recommendations for its improvement, concluded that the available econometric 
evidence was “equivocal.” Specifically, it noted that “quantitative studies that 
ascribe (usually weak) positive effects to codetermination for specific indicators of 
performance and periods of time must be offset against others that find (in most 
cases also weak) negative effects for other or the same indicators and periods. 
Statistically significant results are seldom and their explanatory power value 
seems limited in the light of the results of other studies with which they cannot 
easily be reconciled (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, English summary, p. 6).
1 
 
Although the Commission’s interpretation of the empirical literature on works 
council effects is idiosyncratic – as we shall see, the empirical literature at that 
time at least was certainly less fragmented and its thrust more negative on 
codetermination than it suggested – there can be little doubt that the paucity of 
research has not proved a barrier to policy innovation, and may even have 
facilitated reform. Be that as it may, with the EU legislation now in place, there is 
now something of a scramble to review past findings and conduct new research 
into the economic impact of participative institutions. This is partly because the 
design of the institutions of information and consultation, as well as the 
employment size thresholds that are to apply, is left up to the member states. The 
                                            
1  An English-language summary of the report can be downloaded at www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/endbericht/inhalt_e.html.  4 
reality of legislative review – the process whereby amendments are made to all 
such EU legislation – has of course also played a role. 
 
The present paper is offered as a contribution to this ongoing debate on employee 
involvement. The focus is on Germany and the works council institution. In a sharp 
break with the past literature, several recent empirical studies for Germany have 
suggested that establishments with works councils have much higher productivity 
than their works council-free counterparts. Past research typically pointed to lower 
productivity in works council settings, and indeed to a variety of other unfavorable 
outcomes as well. But, unlike the most recent studies, the earlier productivity 
analyses did not use formal production function tests per se because of missing 
data on capital stock, while their findings for other performance outcomes were 
clouded by the often subjective nature of the indicators (e.g. managerial 
perceptions of financial performance). Using output data, and a variety of 
functional forms, we here investigate the impact of the works council on 
establishment productivity. Specifically, we provide works-council-in-the-
production-function tests, derive estimates of relative plant efficiency using a 
frontier production approach, and also look at productivity growth in the two 
workplace regimes using first difference techniques. The goal is to determine 
whether the recent optimism with respect to works council impact is warranted at a 
time when the EU has mandated domestic works council-like structures in member 
states (as well as international works councils in multinational corporations) and 
Germany has sought to increase the penetration and reach of works councils. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II offers some theoretical conjectures 
on why works councils may be viewed as the exemplar of collective voice. Section 
III provides a concise review of the previous empirical literature, so as to set the 
scene for our own inquiry and specifications. Section IV provides detail on the 
estimating framework, and section V describes the unique, nationally 
representative data set used here. Our detailed findings are reported in section VI. 
A brief interpretative section concludes. 
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKDROP 
The model of collective voice was designed to apply to the trade union (see 
Freeman, 1976; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Previously, justification for union-
induced improvements in performance was linked to notions of X-inefficiency and 
shock effects. The new approach emphasized the communal nature of working  5 
conditions, which affect all workers in the establishment and create a public goods 
problem of preference revelation. By collecting information on the preferences of 
all workers, unions may enable firms to choose a more efficient mix of wage and 
personnel policies. Collective voice not only provides a direct  channel of 
communication between workers and management but also a way of expressing 
dissatisfaction other than through quits. As a result of both forces, labor turnover 
should fall, permitting lower hiring and training costs and stimulating firm-specific 
human capital investments. Increases in efficiency may result. A further potential 
efficiency gain is implied by another public goods aspect of the workplace, namely, 
significant complementarities in effort input. Without some form of collective 
organization, so the argument runs, the incentive of the individual to take into 
account the effect of his actions on others may be too small – just as with 
preference revelation – permitting scope for collective action to improve matters. 
For the public goods argument to have traction, however, there must be costs 
attaching to the use of external markets and, further, the workplace must be 
subject to unforeseen shocks. The presence of such factors means that the firm 
will have a continuing need for information from workers. 
 
This collective voice model is singularly open ended. First, as acknowledged by its 
proponents – and quite apart from the recognition that unions are also monopolies 
– much hinges on management’s response to collective bargaining and on the 
union’s response to any reorganization of the workplace. In short, the collective 
voice model is actually a collective voice/institutional response model. In this 
sense, the circumstances of time and place may play an important role; in 
particular, the effect of the union may vary though time with the maturation of the 
collective bargaining relation, changes in the legal environment, and so on. 
Second, the efficiency benefits attributed to unionism are largely those ascribed to 
the governance apparatus of the internal labor market and efficient but incomplete 
contracting models (e.g. Williamson, Wachter, and Harris, 1975). Since such 
models almost never mention unions, there is a very real issue of whether the 
advantages of collective voice are obtainable without the union entity, through 
other voluntary institutions. 
 
Some recent developments have suggested that the market may fail to produce 
efficient voluntary arrangements after all – echoing the argument made earlier that 
even with unions some legal protection of collective voice is needed (Freeman, 
1976, p. 364). For our purposes the most relevant analysis is Freeman and  6 
Lazear’s (1995) purpose-built works council model.
2  In this model, the joint 
surplus of the firm increases as one moves cumulatively from information 
exchange through consultation to participation. Among other things, information 
rights can help verify management claims about the state of nature, rendering 
them credible to the workforce and avoiding costly disputes – even precipitating 
the failure of the enterprise. Consultation for its part allows new solutions to 
production and other problems by reason of the non-overlapping information sets 
of the two sides and the creativity of discussion. Finally, participation or 
codetermination rights increase the joint surplus by providing workers with more 
job security and encouraging them to take a longer-run view of the firm and its 
prospects.  
 
So far so good because German works councils are distinguished not only by the 
reach of the information exchange and consultation machinery but also, and more 
importantly, by their codetermination (and consent) rights.
3 Unless somehow 
constrained, however, these rights give rise to the self-same bargaining problem 
attaching to all employee involvement models. Freeman and Lazear squarely 
confront this problem (cf. Levine and Tyson, 1990), arguing that the workers’ share 
in the joint surplus grows with that surplus while that of capital declines both 
relatively and absolutely. The workers’ share rises because knowledge and 
involvement are power, so that the same factors that cause the surplus to rise also 
cause profitability to fall. It follows that workers will demand too much 
power/involvement because their share will continue to rise after the joint surplus 
has peaked. Similarly, employers will either oppose works councils or vest them 
with too little power because profits decline even as the surplus is increasing. 
                                            
2  Other supportive theoretical arguments reflect agency considerations. Thus, either institution – 
union or works council – can be construed as a more efficient monitor of managers than the 
shareholder principal (see, respectively, Kuhn, 1985, and Jirjahn, 2002). That said, such 
approaches still confront a bargaining problem.  
3  This is not the place to provide chapter and verse on the powers of the works council (but see 
Müller-Jentsch, 1995; Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner 2003). Suffice it to say here 
that the information and consultation rights are not merely extensive but are also increasing in 
establishment size. To take just one example from information disclosure: in plants with more 
than 100 employees an economic committee has to be set up. This standing body is appointed 
by the works council, and has to be informed by the employer on the current and future 
economic situation of the firm and be given all relevant and financial information. The more 
important codetermination rights of the council cover the commencement and termination of 
working hours, the regulation of overtime and reduced working hours, leave arrangements, the 
introduction of technical devices to monitor employee performance, and remuneration 
arrangements including the fixing of job and bonus rates and other forms of performance related 
pay. (Under the recent changes in the law, works councils may now initiate and codetermine 
vocational training measures in respect of employees whose qualifications are likely to be 
rendered obsolete, and have new codetermination rights in the operation of teamworking.) In 
plants with more than 20 employees, the consent rights of the works council cover the 
engagement, grading/regrading, and transfer of workers as well as individual dismissals.  7 
 
Against this backdrop, Freeman and Lazear see the German institution as 
attractive in two respects. First, the German Betriebsrat can not strike (under the 
so-called ‘peace obligation’). Second, neither can it formally engage in bargaining 
over wages and other conditions of employment unless authorized to do so under 
the relevant industry-level or regional collective bargaining agreement. In this 
respect, the authors speak of a potential ‘decoupling’ of the factors that determine 
the size of the surplus from those that determine its distribution. Left open is 
whether or not there is a sufficient decoupling in practice. At one level, there is 
presumably the requirement that the works council must function within a dual 
system, that is, be embedded in a wider collective bargaining framework that 
exerts some control over the workplace. Beyond that, however, there is the 
unsettled question of the nature of the works council, namely, works council power 
and/or  ‘type’ since we know that bilateral plant agreements negotiated by the 
works council have often ranged well beyond the terms prescribed by the law 
(Müller-Jentsch, 1995). Needless to say, it has proved easier to operationalize the 
formal collective bargaining framework than to accommodate differences in works 
councils. A further complication here is that the rights of the works council under 
the German law are not a datum but are instead increasing in establishment size.  
 
Even if the works council is an exemplary collective voice institution, therefore, 
theory does not provide an unambiguous answer as to its consequences for 
efficiency. And, as we have hinted, the empirical evidence is also mixed. The 
result provides an inauspicious background to the pronounced policy activism of 
recent years. Interestingly, however, although it came too late to inform debate 
and shape these policies, the most recent empirical research has contained some 
of the most favorable evaluations of works council impact. 
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Econometric research into the impact of German works councils on firm 
performance dates from the mid-to-late 1980s. It follows three main stages or 
phases, beginning with studies based on small samples of plants through analyses 
of much larger data sets for manufacturing covering a single region or sector to 
work on truly nationally representative samples of establishments (see Addison, 
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003). Studies within the first phase contain a wide range 
of performance outcomes: objective and subjective measures of profits (see, for 
example, FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985; Addison, Kraft, and Wagner, 1993; Addison and  8 
Wagner, 1997); product innovation and R&D (see FitzRoy and Kraft, 1990; 
Addison and Wagner, 1997; Schnabel and Wagner, 1994); investment in physical 
capital, (Addison, Kraft, and Wagner, 1993), and (excessive) quits (Kraft, 1986). 
And, via a production function framework, two of the studies also estimate works 
council effects on total factor productivity and labor productivity (see, respectively, 
FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987; Addison, Kraft, and Wagner, 1993). These early studies 
do not lack rigor, and on occasion instrument works council presence or otherwise 
seek to account for differences in ‘type’ of works council (see FitzRoy and Kraft, 
1987, 1990; Addison and Wagner, 1997). But they all suffer from the problems 
associated with small sample size.  
 
Studies of the second phase have a basis in two main data sets: the Hannover 
Firm Panel and the NIFA-Panel. The former is a stratified random sample of all 
manufacturing plants with at least 5 employees in the German state of Lower 
Saxony, while the latter covers all establishments in the German machine tool 
industry. They are also panels, covering 1994-98 and 1989-99, respectively. 
Studies using these two data sets thus have the clear advantage of large samples 
of firms – typically exceeding 900 units, as compared with under 100 in the case of 
first phase studies – with detailed plant and industry controls. By the same token, 
however, the two panels lack information on certain key variables, including 
capital. Despite the omitted variables problem, nearly all studies consider works 
council effects on value added per employee (see, inter al., Addison, Schnabel, 
and Wagner, 2001; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2001; Jirjahn, 2002; Frick, 2001). Another 
problem is that the data sets either do not have information on union membership 
at the establishment (the NIFA Panel) or lack reliable information on workplace 
union density (the Hannover Firm Panel). But the studies make up for this by 
exploiting other information on collective bargaining, namely, being covered by a 
collective agreement at industry or regional level. And in one case, an explicit test 
of the Freeman-Lazear argument – encountered in Section II – is offered (see 
Hübler and Jirjahn, 2001). Overt advantages of the new data sets other than the 
greatly expanded number of plants include their panel nature (although the 
‘persistence’ of works councils ultimately means that analysts use stacked cross 
sections rather than panel estimation proper), richer information on employee 
involvement/high performance work practices, and, in the case of the NIFA panel 
actual information on works council type and degree of works council involvement, 
at least as assessed by the manager respondent (see Dilger, 2002). 
 
Studies of the third phase work with data from a truly nationally representative 
source: the Establishment Panel of the Institute for Labor Market Research  9 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-  und Berufsforschung/IAB) of the Federal Labor Office 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). This employment-based IAB Panel is used in the 
present empirical inquiry and is described in section V. Because it contains a 
measure of the capital stock (albeit indirect), the new data set can be used to 
provide works-council-in-the production-function or analogous estimates of labor 
productivity (see Frick, 2002a, 2002b; Wolf and Zwick, 2002; Schank, Schnabel 
and Wagner, 2002). As is the case for the other large-scale data sets, however, 
the ability to fully exploit the longitudinal nature of this panel is constrained by the 
lack of change in works council status over its life to date (1993-2001). 
 
As one moves progressively through the various stages of research, some 
pronounced changes in works council effect are detected. The findings from the 
first phase are frankly pessimistic with respect to the ability of representative 
participation to improve establishment performance. Only one study actually 
reports a beneficial impact – namely, Schnabel and Wagner’s (1994) finding of a 
positive and weakly statistically significant association between works council 
presence and R&D intensity – while others report some strongly negative effects. 
The latter studies include all those by FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990), quite 
irrespective of the outcome indicator examined. These authors offer a 
management pressure/competence interpretation of the evidence, arguing that 
efficient managers are able to elicit greater effort from their workforces and are 
duly rewarded with higher salaries and profits. They are also able to institute 
adequate systems of communication and decision-making without the 
paraphernalia  of a works council, and partly by paying higher wages. Other 
negative results from other studies include investment (Addison, Kraft, and 
Wagner, 1993) and the seeming failure of collective voice (via the works council) 
as compared with individual voice to significantly lower excess quits (Kraft, 1986) – 
the latter result being perhaps the unkindest cut of all.  
 
On the other hand, findings from the second phase are rather more optimistic. The 
general effect of works councils across the  range of outcome indicators is no 
longer adverse with the exception of profitability (which is not an unambiguous 
indicator because the impact may simply be a transfer).  The ‘average’ works 
council effect would furthermore appear to obscure some systematic differences 
by establishment size, collective bargaining coverage, and employee involvement 
mechanism. Thus, if there is the suggestion that small establishments have been 
disadvantaged by works councils, there is also the indication that larger plants 
might need to invent something akin to works councils in the absence of their 
being mandated under law (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 2001). For its part,  10 
collective bargaining outside the plant may assist in decoupling distribution from 
production issues and help focus the works council on the latter, with the indication 
of higher labor productivity in works council plants where these are covered by a 
collective agreement at industry/regional level (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2001). And 
other forms of employee involvement might be pro-productive in works council 
regimes allowing otherwise negative results (such as on profitability) to be 
reversed (see, for example, Dilger, 2002).  
 
Arguably, the third phase is even yet more optimistic about the effect of works 
councils on firm performance, with the two earliest production function studies 
pointing to 25 to 30 per cent higher labor productivity in work council regimes 
(Frick, 2002a, 2002b). These values come from estimates that do not control for 
factors such as unobserved plant heterogeneity. Nevertheless, support for rather 
substantive albeit less flamboyant works council effects are available in 
specifications that at least in part do so (viz. Wolf and Zwick, 2002).  
 
Are we therefore to conclude that more recent research has either contradicted the 
findings of the first phase – or, equivalently, that there has been a sea change in 
works council impact as a result of a maturation in German industrial relations 
practice, as some research outside of economics has suggested (Kotthoff, 1994)? 
We must be cautious in reaching any such conclusion for a number of reasons. 
First, and most obviously, the most recent research is not quite as cut and dried as 
we have suggested. Thus, in estimating a fixed effects frontier production function 
separately for works council and works-council-free regimes in the IAB Panel and 
then comparing technical efficiencies of median plants in the two regimes, Schank, 
Schnabel, and Wagner (2002) find no evidence that works council plants are more 
efficient than their counterparts without councils (i.e. the confidence intervals of the 
reported technical efficiency estimates for the two plants types overlap). 
Furthermore, separate research pointing to higher rates of plant closings among 
the firmament of works council establishments may hint at survivability bias in 
cross section (see Addison, Bellmann, and Kölling, 2004). 
 
Second, one lesson of the second-phase literature is that works council effects 
may differ markedly by establishment size. It seems to be no less important to 
recognize this sensitivity in the production function estimates as well. In particular, 
it makes sense to look at results for a sample of establishments in which the 
powers of the works council are a datum. As a matter of fact, works council power 
is a stepped function of employment and this is likely to be reflected in works 
council frequency as a result of worker choice. Given the difficulty of identifying a  11 
works council equation (in a system of equations or in otherwise instrumenting the 
entity), one natural way is to configure the sample for a range of employment over 
which the council’s competence does not vary.  
 
Third, and relatedly, since the IAB Establishment Panel  does not contain 
information on works council type, there is the problem that above (below) some 
employment threshold virtually all (no) plants have works councils. It is not clear 
how estimates from the IAB Panel are sensitive to or otherwise reflect this 
problem. One solution is to estimate the works council effect over a sample of 
firms with 21 to 100 employees where works councils are found in roughly half the 
sample. No less important, the powers of the works council are also a datum over 
this employment range.  
 
Fourth, although we have not mentioned it thus far, studies presenting the most 
optimistic results from the IAB Establishment Panel also point to sensitivity to 
sector. It would be interesting to discover the sensitivity of production function 
estimates to disaggregation along a number of other dimensions. Finally, because 
there are no formal estimates of works council impact using panel methods, there 
is some virtue in estimating a first difference model as well.  
 
In short, lessons learnt from earlier stages of works council research should inform  
estimation using the IAB Establishment Panel. The present empirical exercise is 
motivated precisely by this concern. 
 
IV. THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we present the functional framework used in our empirical inquiry. 
A straightforward way to characterize the technology of a firm is the production 
function, defined as the maximum output of y attainable with a given set of inputs x 
and a given technology. We will use two production function specifications in our 
empirical analysis: the more general translog and its nested Cobb-Douglas 
specification. 
 
The translog production function – introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 
(1971, 1973) – belongs to the family of flexible functional forms. These are local 
approximations of an arbitrary, twice continuously differentiable production 
function. The translog function is defined as follows: 
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Although this formulation is linear-in-parameters and conceptually simple, it does 
not impose any restrictions on returns-to-scale and the substitution elasticities. In 
our empirical investigations, we use labour (N) and capital (K) as inputs. Hence, 
the general formulation in equation (1) can be written as: 
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where the vector Z captures additional control variables and ε  is an error term. If 
we view the translog as an approximation of the underlying production technology, 
then the higher than second-order terms will be absorbed in the error term. Since 
these terms depend on x (in our case N and K), the parameter estimates will be 
biased and inconsistent. Hence, we shall follow a strategy common to many 
empirical investigations in assuming that the translog is not an approximation but 
rather an exact functional relationship.
4 This allows us to consider the disturbance 
ε  in equation (2) as a white noise error term, comprising random variation of (a) 
the technology of the production unit, (b) the environment of each firm, (c) the 
behavior  of the production unit, and (d) observational errors (measurement or 
aggregation errors). 
 
The output elasticities with respect to employment and capital – namely, the 
percentage change in output following one per cent change in employment and 
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.               ( 4 )  
If we insert the coefficient estimates and values of the sample means for lnN and 
lnK, we obtain estimates of the respective elasticities. Note that constant returns-
to-scale impose the following two restrictions on the parameters: (a) the 
coefficients on the logarithm of employment and the logarithm of capital sum to 
                                            
4  When assuming that the translog exactly represents the underlying production process, tests on the 
separability of factor inputs become more restrictive (see Denny and Fuss, 1977). But separability is not an 
issue in the present study.   13 
unity  ) 1 ( 2 1 = + β β , and (b) the sum of the coefficients on the squared logarithms of 
output and capital and of the interaction term for both logarithms is 
zero ). 0 ( 12 22 11 = + + β β β  
 
The first parametric production function estimated is the Cobb-Douglas type 
specification. Although returns-to-scale are still allowed to be below, equal to or 
above unity, the elasticity of substitution is restricted to one. This model is 
obtained by restricting the coefficients  12 22 11 , , β β β  to be zero. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis that the specification of a Cobb-Douglas technology is appropriate can 
be examined by testing the joint significance of these three coefficients. 
 
Although a production function defines the maximum output obtainable with a 
given set of inputs, not all firms may combine labour and capital in an optimal 
manner. In other words, firms may be technically inefficient because they achieve 
less output than is feasible. But OLS estimation of production functions attributes 
all variation in a firm’s performance that is not explained by the independent 
variables to statistical noise, irrespective of whether or not this variation is under a 
firm’s control. Production function estimates are then obtained by simply averaging 
this unobserved firm heterogeneity. As a result, we obtain averages rather than 
frontiers. Expressed  differently, the estimated functions pass through the data 
rather than surrounding the data.  
 
By contrast, the stochastic production frontier approach, developed by Aigner, 
Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), assembles 
production frontiers and measures a firm’s efficiency relative to the constructed 
frontier. In order to distinguish unobserved random variation from unobserved 
inefficiency, the error term comprises two components: 
 
i it it u v − = ε .                    ( 5 )  
 
Note that equation (5) introduces a firm index i and a time index t, both of which 
subscripts have been omitted thus far for expositional convenience. 
Now it v captures statistical white noise and  i u depicts technical inefficiency, which is 
assumed to be non-negative and time-invariant.  
 
Defining  i i u − = 0 β β , equation (2) may be rewritten: 
it i v Z K N
K N









11 2 1 ,    (6)  14 
which can be estimated by a fixed-effects regression. Following Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984), we shall normalize the efficiency of the most efficient plant as 100 
per cent. Hence, estimates of the technical inefficiencies of the other plants are 
obtained as intercept shifts relative to the most efficient plant: 
 
i j j i u β β − = max ˆ .                   ( 7 )  
 
Since equation (6) is specified in logarithms, producer-specific estimates of 
technical efficiencies, defined as the ratio of a plant’s actual output to its maximum 
attainable output, are then given by: 
 
}, ˆ exp{ i i u TE − =                  ( 8 )  
 
which is bounded by zero and one. In a second stage, we shall compare the 
median technical efficiency of plants having a works council with the median 
technical efficiency of plants where no works council is present. 
 
There are estimators other than fixed effects available to the investigator, namely, 
random effects and maximum likelihood. However, the great virtue of the present 
estimator is that the technical efficiencies are not required to be uncorrelated with 
the regressors. Nor for that matter are any distributional assumptions required for 
the  i u . The downside of estimating the stochastic production frontier by fixed 
effects is that time-invariant firm characteristics reappear in the estimated fixed 
effects (in addition to technical inefficiency), and therefore influence the estimated 
inefficiencies. However, in the present context, this could only have an impact on 
our findings were these time-invariant firm characteristics to be correlated with the 
existence of a works council. 
 
V. THE DATA SET AND ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
DATA. 
Our data are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute for 
Employment Research of the Federal Labor Office. Each year since 1993 (1996), 
this panel has surveyed several thousand establishments from all sectors of the 
economy in western (eastern) Germany. It is based on a stratified random sample 
– strata for 16 industries and 10 size classes – from the population of all 
establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance. To correct 
for panel mortality, exits, and newly-founded units, the data are augmented  15 
regularly, yielding an unbalanced panel. Participation of establishments is 
voluntary, but the response rates (which exceed 70 per cent) are high compared 
with other non-official German firm panel studies. Data are collected in personal 
interviews with the owners or senior managers of the establishments by 
professional interviewers. The panel is created to serve the needs of the Federal 
Labor Office, and so its focus is on employment-related matters. Note that the IAB 
panel is the only German nationally representative longitudinal sample of 
establishments that can be used to investigate the impact of works councils. 
Details regarding the IAB panel (including information on the questionnaire(s) and 
how to access the data) are given in Kölling (2000). 
 
Our inquiry uses information for the years 1997 to 2000. Note that some of the 
information related to year t is asked for in the survey conducted in the following 
year – an example being total sales in year t – so we actually use data from five 
surveys. The early years of the panel were excluded because one focus of the 
present exercise is to effect comparisons between western and eastern Germany. 
As noted, establishments in eastern Germany were only surveyed from 1996 
onward. And we do not employ data for 1996 because we use information on 
replacement investment to measure capital input, and this question was asked for 
the first time only in 1997. 
 
We shall consider establishments across all sectors (but see below) and 
establishments from the two broad sectors of manufacturing and services. 
Because output is measured differently for establishments from banking and 
insurance, and for public sector establishments, these industries are excluded 
here. Furthermore, we excluded establishments in agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries for two reasons: (a) the production process in this branch differs from that 
in other sectors, and (b) works councils are present in just three percent of all such 
establishments, as compared with twelve percent in the rest of the economy. 
 
According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils can be elected in 
all establishments with at least five employees. We shall therefore exclude all 
establishments with less than five employees in at least one year. But note that, 
consistent with the terms of the legislation, part-time workers and apprentices are 
counted in full in this total. The empirical models are estimated for all 
establishments, and separately for establishments with 21 to 100 employees. It will 
be recalled that the reasons for this strategy are twofold.  First of all, works council 
rights tend to increase with firm size, but are constant within certain size intervals. 
Looking at firms from one such size class is a way to control for heterogeneity of  16 
works councils. Second of all, although works councils are rare among very small 
establishments, establishments without a works council are rare in higher size 
classes (see, for example, Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2002). On 
the other hand, as can be seen from the unweighted figures in the lower panel of 
Table 1, for the size interval of 21 to 100 employees one-third of the 
establishments in our sample have a works council. Accordingly, this category is 
especially well suited to investigate works council effects. Note that according to 
the weighted figures reported in the upper panel of the table, works councils are 
more commonly encountered in manufacturing than services in western Germany 
whereas the opposite is true for eastern Germany. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY. 
In investigating the impact of works councils on establishment productivity, we 
apply three different estimation strategies, each based on one variant of the 
production function approach. These strategies use different definitions of some of 
the variables and therefore need to be discussed here. Beginning with our first 
approach, this uses pooled data for 1997 to 2000 to estimate translog production 
functions (discussed in section IV) by OLS. As was noted earlier, the translog 
specification is preferred here because it is the least restrictive production function, 
nesting Cobb-Douglas and other specifications (such as CES). 
 
The endogenous variable, output, is measured by the volume of total sales of the 
establishment in a year. Ideally, output should be measured in physical units, but 
this information is not available in the IAB panel. In recent studies by Frick (2002b) 
and Wolf and Zwick (2002) using the same panel, value added (computed by 
subtracting the costs of materials from sales) is used as a measure of output. 
Although conceptually superior to total sales, this measure suffers from two 
shortcomings. First, the interviewees are asked to estimate the percentage share 
of total sales represented by materials cost, and (1 minus) this share is used in 
conjunction with sales volume to yield the value added measure. We consider the 
results of this exercise to be little more than “informed guesstimates” of an 
unknown quality,
5 whereas the figures for total sales are numbers well known to an 
owner or manager of an establishment. Second, interviewees often fail to answer 
                                            
5  We consider the results as only informed guesstimates for two reasons. First, almost two thirds of the 
observations are in multiples of 5 per cent, implying measurement error. Second, the reported share of 
material costs changes on average by 11.6 per cent in any two years, which is unrealistically high.  17 
the enabling ‘cost share’ question so that use of value added involves a large 
reduction in the number of observations. For example, the sample of all 
establishments with five or more employees would be reduced by 20 per cent 
(from 11,464 to 9,361 units) if we used value added. Given that log total sales and 
log value added (constructed as above) are highly positively correlated for the 
establishments in the IAB panel and for all the sub-samples considered here,
6 we 
opted not to lose a large part of the sample and work with sales volume as our 
proxy for output. 
 
Turning to the exogenous variables, a crucial argument is of course the presence 
or otherwise of a works council. But although information on most variables is 
collected for each wave of the panel, this is not the case for the works council 
dummy variable. Specifically, the works council question was asked of all 
establishments in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2000, and in the ‘missing’ years only of 
panel accessions. For establishments that were not panel accessions in 1997, we 
proceeded as follows. Interpolation was used if the reported works council status 
was identical either side of this missing year, and the  establishment was duly 
classified as having or not having a works council. However, establishments that 
reported different works council regimes in 1996 and 1998 were excluded from the 
sample in the missing year.
7 
 
For its part, labor input is simply measured by the total number of employees. Note 
that we did not correct this total by computing full-time equivalents for part-time 
workers or by adjusting for the lower input per head of apprentices, because of 
missing values for the hours and productivity of the two groups. But we did seek to 
take account of these compositional effects by entering the percentage 
employment shares of part-time workers and apprentices as separate control 
variables. Furthermore, we also included the percentage share of skilled workers 
in an attempt to control for differences in the quality of labor inputs. Evidently, 
hours worked would be a better measure of labor input. Unfortunately, such   
information as is available on hours worked per week, overtime, and short-time 
work in the IAB panel does not allow the construction of an “hours worked per 
year” variable. 
 
                                            
6  Using pooled data for 1997 to 2000, the correlation coefficients for the all-establishment sample and for 
manufacturing and services are 0.942, 0.962, and 0.891, respectively. The corresponding values for 
western (eastern) Germany are 0.950 (0.918), .970 (0.937), and .900 (0.875). 
7  Information on establishments that were not panel accessions in 1999 was already interpolated by the IAB, 
based on information in 1998.  18 
The IAB panel does not give any direct information on the capital stock used in the 
establishment. This is of course a common problem when working with firm-level 
survey data. As a measure for capital input in year t, we use the average amount 
of replacement investment reported for years t-1 and t. The basic idea behind this 
procedure is that the known amount of replacement investment is expected to be 
proportional to the unknown amount of capital stock. Note, however, that about 30 
per cent of all establishments in the sample report a value of zero for replacement 
investments at least once. This problem has not been dealt with in earlier papers 
using replacement investment in t as a proxy for capital stock in that year (cf. Frick 
2002b). In our study, all firms reporting zero replacement investment in both year 
t-1 and year t are excluded from the sample for year t. This reduces our sample by 
2,665 observations, or about 17 per cent. 
 
Differences in the quality of the capital stock employed are proxied by two 
variables: first, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the establishment 
invested in information and communication technologies in year t; and, second, an 
index indicating the state of technology in year t (ranging from 1 = “up-to-date” 
down to 5 = “very old”). Finally, whether or not an establishment is 
(contemporaneously) covered by a collective agreement is included as a further 
control variable, along with dummies for industry, year and eastern Germany. 
 
The empirical models are estimated by OLS based on an unbalanced panel made 
of pooled data for the four years 1997 to 2000.
8 By applying OLS to the 
unbalanced panel data we do not deal with two issues that now require some 
discussion, namely, works council endogeneity and unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. As far as the endogeneity issue is concerned, we know that works 
council presence is not random but is related to establishment size and the 
structure of the work force, among other things (see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, 
and Wagner, 2002). However, the introduction or presence of a works council is 
not the result of a rational choice made by the owners or managers of an 
establishment based on comparing costs and benefits; rather, it is the results of 
actions taken by the employees. Employee action might well be related the to the 
past performance of the establishment, but whether an establishment has a works 
council at a point in time should not be viewed as caused by contemporaneous 
productivity. We would argue that works council presence is exogenous to an 
establishment in a sense that allows us to neglect the endogeneity issue in a study 
                                            
8  Stata/SE 7.0 was used to estimate the empirical models, using the cluster(establishment) option because 
observations are considered to be independent across but not necessarily within establishments. For the 
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient vector the Huber/White estimator was used.  19 
of productivity, not least given the enormous difficulties of identifying the works 
council equation in a convincing manner. 
 
In estimating our translog production function, we did not exploit the panel nature 
of the data. Although doing so might be expected to solve problems stemming 
from unobserved differences between establishments, we confronted the practical 
difficulty that the proportion of establishments in which works councils were 
introduced or abandoned during the sample period is rather small. For our non-
stratified regression sample, which comprises 5,684 establishments, only 117 
establishments (or 2 per cent) changed their works council status in either 
direction. Hence, results based on a fixed-effects panel estimator to control for 
unobserved time invariant establishment specific influences would be driven by 
this small sub-sample of establishments. Furthermore, we think that we have good 
reasons not to be overly concerned with this issue. Unobserved establishment 
heterogeneity  – due, say, to differences in management quality – leads to 
inconsistent estimates of the works council effect on productivity only if these 
unobserved characteristics are correlated both with productivity (as we would 
expect to be the case) and also with the existence of a works council. The latter 
relation might hold, with workers forming or maintaining a works council when 
managers are bad and/or a plant shutdown is expected (or alternatively when 
managers are excellent and they want to increase their piece of the pie), but is this 
correlation likely to be strong enough to lead to inconsistent estimates in pooled 
cross sections? If the presence or not of a works council can be considered 
exogeneous to an establishment (as was argued earlier), then we have good 
reasons to expect that neglecting the unobserved heterogeneity issue (because 
the small number of switchers makes the application of fixed effects estimators 
inappropriate) will not cause inconsistency in the point estimates of works council 
impact obtained by OLS. 
 
Our second estimation strategy uses a stochastic production frontier model to 
estimate technical efficiency in plants with and without a works council. The 
definitions of output, inputs, and the control variables exactly follow those of the 
first strategy (pooled OLS estimates) other than in the treatment of the works 
council. Using pooled data, we first estimate production functions using a fixed 
effects approach (ignoring the works council status of the plant) to obtain an 
estimate of the technical efficiency of an establishment. This is constructed from 
the plant average of the error term over time, corrected for the average industry  20 
effect.
9 The sample is then divided into plants with and without a works council, 
and we compare the technical efficiency (along with its confidence interval) of the 
median plant in each regime. 
 
Our third and final approach differs from these two approaches in focusing on 
productivity growth. The output variable is the difference in an establishment’s log 
total sales between 1997 and 2000. Works council status is indicated by three 
dummy variables: establishments with a works a council in 1997 and 2000; those 
without a council in 1997 but with one in 2000; and those with a council in 1997 
but without one in 2000. The reference group is thus made up of establishments 
without a works council in both years. Change in labor input is measured by the 
difference in the log number of employees in an establishment between 1997 and 
2000. We also include changes in the percentage shares of part-time workers, 
apprentices, and skilled workers to control for compositional changes in the work 
force. Given the lack of information on the capital stock in the establishment in 
1997 and 2000, the change in this input was obtained as follows. We first 
estimated the capital stock in 1997 by multiplying the two-year average of 
replacement investment in 1996 and 1997 by six, the assumption being that 
capital depreciates over six years at a constant rate. For each of the following 
years, the capital stock is measured as the sum of the capital stock in the previous 
year plus the amount of extension (i.e. net) investment reported for the current 
year. In other words, the capital stock in 2000 is given by the two-year average of 
replacement investment in 1996 and 1997, multiplied by six, plus the sum of 
extension investments over each of the next three years.
10 On this occasion, our 
empirical model uses a Cobb-Douglas type production function, since F-tests did 
not reject this functional form in favor of the more general translog specification at 
the 5 percent level. To control for changes in the quality of the capital stock, we 
included the average value of the dummy variable indicating investment in 
information and communication technology over the sample period, and the 
average of the index indicating the state of technology in each year. Finally, 
coverage by a collective agreement or otherwise is handled via three dummy 
                                            
9  Having obtained technical efficiencies for each plant according to equations (6) and (7), we eliminated 
those plants that were in the top and the bottom percentile of the efficiency distribution and repeated the 
analysis. This should ensure that our results are not contaminated by outliers. Furthermore, since it would 
not make much sense to draw conclusions about  technical efficiency from plants that only make one 
appearance in the regression sample, we report the technical efficiency and its confidence interval of the 
plant that is observed four times and which is closest to the median. Although this procedure had little 
effect on measured efficiency it did affect the reported confidence intervals. 
10  In its official estimates of the capital stock, the German Federal Statistical Office uses depreciation periods 
of six and thirteen years (see Schmalwasser, 2001). As a sensitivity analysis, we repeated our calculations 
using the thirteen year rule. The results were scarcely affected and we therefore report (and discuss) 
estimates based on a six year depreciation cycle alone.  21 
variables constructed in the same manner as the works council dummies. The 
empirical model(s) was estimated by OLS using a heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix estimator. 
 
VI. FINDINGS 
We next provide results from each of our three estimation strategies, and put them 
into perspective.
11 The first procedure it will be recalled uses unbalanced panel 
data for 1997 to 2000 to estimate translog production functions by OLS. Separate 
regressions were undertaken  for all establishments, for establishments with 21 to 
100 employees, and separately for establishments by broad sectors 
(manufacturing and services) for Germany as a whole and for western and eastern 
Germany. Our findings are collected in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
 
[Tables 2 through 4 near here] 
 
Our discussion will focus largely on the estimated coefficient for the works council 
dummy variable in the various specifications. For the complete sample of all 
establishments (11,464 observations for a total of 5,684 units), a highly significant 
coefficient of 0.232 is reported in column 1 of Table 2. This implies a beneficial 
effect of works council presence on productivity of 26.1 per cent.
12 This effect is 
somewhat lower (higher) if we look at establishments from western (eastern) 
Germany only (see column 1, Tables 3 and 4); and it is lower (higher) in 
establishments from manufacturing (services) in each of the three regions (see 
columns 3 and 5, Tables 2, 3, and 4). All of these positive coefficient estimates are 
statistically different from zero at a significance level of 1 per cent or better, and 
range from 12 per cent (manufacturing establishments in western Germany) to 
34.2 percent (services in eastern Germany). 
 
As was discussed in section IV, the flexibility of the translog specification derives 
from the inclusion of squared employment and capital terms and the interaction of 
employment and capital. These allow the output elasticities to vary with 
employment and capital. For the full sample of all establishments with five or more 
employees (reported in columns 1, 3 and 5 of Tables 2, 3, and 4), these three 
                                            
11  All computations were performed at the Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor Service, 
using Stata/SE 7.0. To facilitate replication and extensions the do-files are available from 
thorsten.schank@wiso.uni-erlangen.de. 
12  The estimated coefficient ß of the works council dummy has to be transformed using the formula 100(e
ß
-1) 
to obtain the percentage change in the endogenous variable.  22 
coefficients are in all cases jointly statistically significant at the 10 per cent level or 
better. Hence, the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas formulation is always rejected. 
For the sub-samples comprising establishments with 21 to 100 employees 
(reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Tables 2, 3, and 4) the Cobb-Douglas 
specification is not rejected in five out of nine cases. This result is not surprising, 
however, because there is less reason to believe that the output elasticities will 
vary within a narrowly defined size class. 
 
It should be noted that, in the full sample regressions, the squared employment 
term and the interaction term between employment and capital are in all cases 
jointly significant (even if neither of them is statistically significant at conventional 
levels when tested separately). Moreover, in six out of nine cases, each has a 




The output elasticities with respect to employment and capital, which can not 
directly be observed from the coefficient estimates, are derived according to 
equation (3) and (4). Since they obviously vary with the quantity of labor and 
capital used as inputs, we report elasticities at sample means (of the logarithm of 
each variable) in the lower parts of Tables 2, 3, and 4. The employment elasticity 
of output varies by sector, size class, and region between 75 and 95 per cent. The 
capital elasticity is much lower, ranging between 8.2 and 13.4 per cent. In both 
western and eastern Germany, we observe a higher employment elasticity in 
manufacturing than in services. Both elasticities are larger in the full sample than 
in the sub-sample of establishments with 21 to 100 employees in all but one case 
(namely, the employment elasticity in the east German service sector). There are 
no systematic differences between the two regions. 
 
We should add in passing that the estimated coefficients for the control variables 
indexing the quality of the capital stock (investment in information and computer 
technology and state of technology) and the labor force (percentage share of part-
time workers, apprentices, and skilled workers), as well as dummy variable for 
establishments from eastern Germany, all have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at a conventional level in most cases. On the other hand, 
the variable indicating coverage by collective bargaining turns out to be 
insignificant or at best only marginally significant.  
 
                                            
13   This is evident from equation (3) in section IV. If  11 β  and  12 β are negative (and employment and capital 
are positively correlated), the output elasticity with respect to employment rises if employment increases.  23 
Returning to the question that motivates this inquiry, we do not find the magnitude 
of the estimates of works council impact on productivity reported for 
establishments with five or more employees to be credible.
14 Even if there are 
good theoretical reasons in the collective voice tradition (discussed in section II) to 
suggest that works councils might have a positive net impact on firm performance, 
one would not expect effects of this size given that establishments with and 
without works councils compete in the same market. If correct, the estimates imply 
that firms would actively encourage the election of a works council. Suffice it to say 
that there is no indication of this in the broader works council literature. 
 
There are a number of reasons to suspect that estimates from this first step in our 
empirical investigation of works council effects on productivity are artefacts of the 
data. One reason could be that size effects are insufficiently controlled for. As 
pointed out in section V, works councils tend to be rare in small establishments 
and ubiquitous in large ones. If productivity tends to increase with establishment 
size due to economies of scale, a positive relationship between works council 
presence and productivity will show up in the data even if there is no causal link 
between works councils and productivity. We further argued that a partial solution 
would be to look at establishments from a size interval in which both regimes are 
reasonably represented and where the rights of the works council are a datum. We 
now implement this notion by looking at the sub-sample(s) of establishments with 
21 to 100 employees. The results are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Tables 2, 
3, and 4. Compared with the results earlier reported for the all-establishment 
sample (with five or more employees), the point estimates for the works council 
effect are much lower – and even negative for manufacturing establishments in 
western Germany – and they are insignificant or only marginally significant for four 
out of nine empirical models. If we look at the two regions and the two broad 
sectors, the estimated coefficients of the works council dummy variable are 
positive and significant at the five percent level or better only among 
establishments in the services sector. For services, productivity appears to be 20.4 




But these values are still surprisingly high. If the estimates of the coefficients of the 
works council dummy in the models using pooled data do after all indicate “true” 
positive productivity differentials in favor of works councils, we would also expect 
                                            
14   Interestingly, Frick (2002) reports similar works council effects without questioning their magnitude. 
15 It is not clear to us why the impact of works councils on productivity should be stronger for the service 
sector.  24 
these effects to show up in identically specified econometric models estimated for 
repeated cross sections of the data (i.e. for individual years). Furthermore, we 
would expect the point estimates to be of a similar  order of magnitude in 1997, 
1998, 1999, and 2000, even if the respective samples will not be identical due to 
panel attritions and accessions.  
 
[Table 5 near here] 
 
Table 5 gives the coefficient estimates for the works council variable from such  
repeated cross sections. The general impression from the table is that the point 
estimates for firms with 21 to 100 employees are not only very often statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels but also rather volatile from year to year. 
Looking at service-sector establishments, for example, we observe that the 
estimated works council effects are statistically insignificant in three out of four 
years in western and eastern Germany, while the point estimates vary from -7.2 
per cent to 36.5 per cent in western Germany and lie between 7.5 and 27.4 per 
cent for eastern Germany. We interpret this extreme degree of instability over 
time, coupled with the lack of statistical significance in three out of four years, as 
cautioning against positive effects of works councils on productivity from a translog 
production function approach. 
 
Our second empirical approach to uncovering the impact of works councils on 
establishment productivity is to use a stochastic production frontier model. As 
discussed earlier, the aim is to compare estimates of technical efficiency in plants 
with and without a works council. Table 6 reports the estimated technical 
efficiencies and their confidence intervals for the median plant in the two regimes. 
We feel safer in reporting the median than the mean, because the former should 
be less prone to outliers. A comparison of the reported values for each of the two 
groups of establishments within each cell reveals whether one group is more 
efficient (i.e. produces more output with the same quantity of inputs). 
 
[Table 6 near here] 
 
The median value of the technical efficiency estimates for establishments with a 
works council exceeds the respective value for establishments without one in all 
samples. When we focus on establishments with 21 to 100 employees (for the 
reasons discussed above), however, we see that the 95 percent confidence 
intervals for the two groups of establishments overlap in all nine cases. In other 
words, the differences in the values are not statistically significant at conventional  25 
levels. Therefore, there is no clear-cut evidence from the stochastic production 
frontier model that works councils are either good or bad for technical efficiency. 
 
[Table 7 near here] 
 
Our final approach differs from the other tests in considering works council impact 
on the growth in productivity between 1997 and 2000.
16 Results of this alternative, 
first-difference approach are reported in Table 7. In the model, establishments 
without a works council in both the starting year (1997) and in the end year (2000) 
form the reference group. Compared with these firms, the estimates  in the first 
row of the table  indicate that establishments with a works council in both years did 
not record a different performance on average – none of the coefficient estimates 
is statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The same holds for 
establishments in which a works council was set up during the sample period 
under investigation, and indeed for most samples of establishments in which the 
works council ceased to exist after 1997.
17  
 
The output elasticity with respect to employment is on average 64 per cent and 
has fallen by exactly one third vis-a-vis the regressions using levels of variables 
(see Tables 2 through 5). It is larger in manufacturing than in services and, 
somewhat surprisingly, it is larger for eastern than for western Germany. By 
contrast, controlling for other factors, the average growth in output is found to be 
larger for western Germany. But the coefficient estimate for the change in the 
capital stock is positive and statistically significant in just two out of six models. 
Similarly, the coefficients of the control variables are insignificant in almost all 
cases. The general insignificance of these covariates may reflect insufficient 
variation in the control variables, as well as measurement error which becomes 
more important when differencing.  As a result, the change in employment 
accounts for almost all of the explained variation in output change. The bottom line 
of this exercise is that the works council has neither a positive nor a negative 
effect on productivity growth.  
 
In summary, we have analyzed works councils’ productivity effects from three 
different perspectives. The evidence points in the same direction: they seemingly 
                                            
16   Note that we can not further disaggregate by manufacturing and services for the two broad regions on this 
occasion due to the small number of cases. 
17   The only exception is establishments with 21 to 100 employees that had a works council in 1997 but not in 
2000, and which according to the highly statistically significant point estimate reported in Table 7 had a 
rate of change in productivity 25 per cent above that of firms without a works council in both years. 
However, as a practical matter, this particular ‘group’ of switchers comprises a single establishment.  26 
neither reduce nor enhance productivity, technical efficiency, or productivity 
growth. Accordingly, their massive effect on productivity as reported in earlier 
studies based on the IAB Establishment Panel do not survive disaggregation by 
broad sector and region. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We are now into the third stage of research into the effect of German works 
councils on firm performance that uses data from the nationally representative IAB 
Establishment Panel. The evidence supplied here suggests that harsh dismissal of 
the institution based on rent seeking considerations or slowed decision taking is 
just as misplaced as the view that the presence of a works council is a productivity 
cure-all while also delivering on industrial democracy. Arguably, the former 
position was commonplace by the end of the first stage of economic research on 
work councils, while the second has recently been gaining currency as a result of 
some very optimistic estimates of works council impact using the IAB data.  
 
In addressing works council effects on productivity, 1997-2000, the present study 
has performed three separate tests: the first strategy was to recoup the works 
council effect directly by estimating translog production functions that include a 
works council dummy, using pooled data and OLS methods; the second approach 
estimated a stochastic production frontier model using fixed effects to compare the 
technical efficiency of the median works council plant with that of its works-council-
free counterpart; and the third test offered a modified first-difference model linking 
productivity growth to (changes in) works council status. Consistent with other 
research, for the sample of all establishments, the results of the first exercise 
pointed to positive and well-defined works council effects on productivity of around 
25 per cent. The problem is that in estimating production functions across this 
sample, we are not accounting for differences in works council power or in works 
council coverage, both of which are influenced by establishment size. Since 
productivity will also be related to establishment size where there are economies 
of scale, there is the possibility that the observed productivity differential in favor of 
works councils may be a chimera. As a partial solution to this problem, given the 
lack of plausible identifying instruments for works council presence and no 
independent information on works council type, we presented results for a 
subsample of plants with between 21 and 100 workers. Over this employment 
range, the legal powers of the council are a datum and works councils plants are 
found in roughly one-third of the sample. The coefficient estimates for the works  27 
council dummy (a) plummeted, (b) were actually negative albeit statistically 
insignificant for the crucial west German manufacturing sector, and (c) were 
statistically insignificant in three out of the four unstacked cross sections. 
 
For their part, our frontier production function tests revealed a similar pattern of 
results. For the all-plant sample it was found that the technical efficiency of the 
median works council plant everywhere exceeded that of its counterpart works-
council-free plant. For the restricted sample of plants with 21-100 employees, 
however, the differences were nowhere statistically significant. And although the 
results of our final test are inherently more speculative because of measurement 
error and the small number of switchers, they too support the notion that there are 
likely to be few differences on average between plants with works councils and 
plants without them. 
 
The finding that there are no works council effects on average is not unimportant 
in its own right given the history of German research in this area. Thus, for 
example, it suggests that the pessimistic findings of the early (i.e. first phase) 
literature are unrepresentative, unless there has been a sea change in the 
industrial relation climate in recent years – or perhaps in the market environment. 
But for the future it will be necessary to go behind these average effects. In this 
connection, we might usefully note that in reestimating their earlier (phase one) 
production function study which had pointed to sharply lower total factor 
productivity in works council firms, FitzRoy and Kraft were to report that such 
effects could be undone by profit sharing (see, FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987, 1995). It 
would be interesting to see if similar improvements – from a non-negative average 
effect – are discernible in future waves of the panel providing more data points on 
profit sharing. Finally, to the list of things we need to know more about, there are 
performance outcomes other than productivity. One such outcome that has been 
examined using IAB data is plant closings. Another that has yet to be examined is 
profitability. That being said, each measure is inherently more ambiguous from an 
efficiency perspective than the indicator examined here.   
Table 1:  Works Councils Presence in Establishments (Percentages)  
 Total  Manufacturing  Services 
  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N  ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N  ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N  ≥  21 
   








12.0  29.0 15.3  34.3 10.8  25.8 
eastern 
Germany 
10.6  26.0 9.3 22.7 12.0  28.9 
          
          
          










49.7  36.6 64.1  44.6 34.7  28.2 
eastern 
Germany 
34.1  30.3 34.6  27.9 33.9  32.9 
Source:  IAB-Establishment Panel, 1997-2000. 
  
Table 2:  OLS Regressions of a Translog Production Function 
(pooled estimates,1997-2000; dependent variable: total sales (log Y)) 
   Total  Manufacturing  Services 
Establishment 
Size 
  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21 
    (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
  0.232  0.118 0.177  0.046 0.275  0.183  Works council  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [8.88]***  [3.22]***  [5.71]*** [1.03]  [6.31]*** [3.05]*** 
  1.041  0.446 1.117  0.228 1.075  0.629  Number of 
employees 
( N log ) 
  [17.80]***  [0.70] [15.92]***  [0.30] [11.92]***  [0.60] 
  -0.075  -0.168 -0.098  -0.063 -0.072  -0.257  Capital stock 
( K log )   [1.59]  [1.70]*  [1.89]*  [0.41]  [0.96]  [2.01]** 
  -0.025  0.132 -0.023  0.171 -0.029  0.092  N
2 log  
  [1.59]  [0.79] [1.20]  [0.77] [1.32]  [0.35] 
  0.017  0.026 0.019  0.013 0.02 0.037  K
2 log  
 [2.83]***  [3.30]***  [2.71]***  [1.25]  [2.25]**  [3.32]*** 
  -0.004  -0.009  -0.006 0.001  -0.011 -0.018  K N log log  
  [0.43]  [0.44] [0.54]  [0.04] [1.03]  [0.63] 
  0.124  0.096 0.105  0.051 0.145  0.147  Investment in ICT 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [7.55]***  [3.72]***  [5.75]*** [1.72]*  [4.88]*** [3.38]*** 
  -0.082  -0.083 -0.076  -0.077 -0.085  -0.101  State of technology 
(index: 1= up-to-
date; 5 = very old) 
 
  [7.71]***  [4.62]*** [6.36]***  [3.74]*** [4.57]***  [3.29]*** 
  -0.992  -1.02  -1.455 -1.544  -0.735 -0.817  Part-time workers 
(percentage) 
 
  [15.26]***  [9.24]*** [15.36]***  [9.28]*** [9.09]***  [6.28]*** 
  -0.892  -0.761 -1.114  -1.506 -0.567  0.162  Apprentices 
(percentage) 
 
  [7.46]***  [3.23]*** [8.72]***  [6.24]*** [2.62]***  [0.37] 
  0.344  0.379 0.234  0.305 0.432  0.391  Skilled workers 
(percentage) 
 
  [9.61]***  [6.16]*** [5.43]***  [3.60]*** [7.73]***  [4.49]*** 
  0.037  0.034 0.019  0.034 0.086  0.06  Collective 
agreement 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [1.88]*  [1.10] [0.92]  [0.91] [2.27]**  [1.10] 
  -0.355  -0.33  -0.298 -0.267  -0.417 -0.42  eastern Germany 
(dummy) 
 
  [16.63]***  [9.27]*** [12.55]***  [5.99]*** [11.37]***  [7.24]*** 
  11.976  13.914 11.986  13.803 12.597  14.665  Constant 
  [51.05]***  [10.06]***  [48.35]*** [8.40]***  [33.48]*** [6.58]*** 
Output elasticities 
at sample means 
           
YN ε     0.892  0.835 0.945  0.894 0.833  0.763 
p-value    [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
YK ε     0.122  0.105 0.114  0.093 0.124  0.113 
p-value    [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
             
No. of observations    11465  3595  6870  1987  4595  1608 
No. of plants    5684  1839  3413  1032  2271  807 
R
2    0.90  0.60 0.93  0.57 0.83  0.62 
Notes: Regressions also include sector and year dummies. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01,. 05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
Table 3:  OLS Regressions of a Translog Production Function  
– western Germany  
(pooled estimates, 1997-2000; dependent variable: total sales (log Y)) 
   Total  Manufacturing  Services 
Establishment 
Size 
  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21 
    (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 0.206  0.098  0.113  -0.042  0.27  0.186  Works council  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [5.21]*** [1.80]*  [2.59]*** [0.71]  [4.14]*** [2.04]** 
  1.028  0.952 1.29 1.118 0.993  1.036  Number of 
employees 
( N log ) 
  [12.05]***  [0.95] [14.32]***  [0.93] [7.71]***  [0.69] 
  -0.058 -0.327  -0.119 0.001  -0.053 -0.49  Capital stock 
( K log )   [0.81]  [2.13]**  [1.67]*  [0.00]  [0.46]  [2.68]*** 
 -0.026  -0.09  0.011  -0.034  -0.056  -0.123  N
2 log  
  [1.17]  [0.36] [0.56]  [0.10] [1.89]*  [0.34] 
  0.015  0.032 0.03 0.012 0.011  0.046  K
2 log  
 [1.67]*  [3.11]***  [3.31]***  [1.11]  [0.82]  [2.79]*** 
 -0.001  0.015  -0.03  -0.01  0.007  0.014  K N log log  
  [0.10]  [0.40] [2.50]**  [0.24] [0.46]  [0.24] 
  0.104  0.115 0.088  0.075 0.112  0.15  Investment in ICT 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [4.18]*** [2.82]***  [3.18]*** [1.67]*  [2.63]*** [2.29]** 
  -0.053  -0.067 -0.036  -0.038 -0.064  -0.102  State of technology 
(index: 1= up-to-
date; 5 = very old) 
 
  [3.62]***  [2.49]**  [2.26]** [1.29]  [2.56]** [2.39]** 
  -1.049  -1.018 -1.317  -1.598 -0.862  -0.724  Part-time workers 
(percentage) 
 
  [11.91]***  [6.43]*** [9.89]***  [7.36]*** [7.97]***  [3.67]*** 
  -1.175 -1.042  -1.555 -2.51  -0.786 0.189  Apprentices 
(percentage) 
 
 [5.56]***  [2.30]**  [6.18]***  [6.19]***  [2.45]**  [0.27] 
  0.446  0.412 0.293  0.291 0.576  0.475  Skilled workers 
(percentage) 
 
  [8.80]*** [4.46]***  [4.92]*** [2.56]**  [7.52]*** [3.69]*** 
 0.008  0.012  -0.021  -0.035  0.073  0.043  Collective 
agreement 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [0.24]  [0.21] [0.62]  [0.55] [1.34]  [0.49] 
  11.837  13.256 11.642  11.091 12.572  15.283  Constant 
  [29.28]***  [5.85]*** [27.51]***  [4.43]*** [21.78]***  [4.71]*** 
Output elasticities 
at sample means 
           
YN ε     0.900  0.789 0.943  0.860 0.872  0.748 
p-value 
 
  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
YK ε     0.127  0.109 0.134  0.102 0.106  0.102 
p-value    [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
             
No. of observations    5843  1646  3347  789  2496  857 
No. of plants    3120  944  1717  439  1403  505 
R
2    0.91  0.55 0.94  0.61 0.84  0.54 
Notes: Regressions also include sector and year dummies. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01,. 05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
Table 4:  OLS Regressions of a Translog Production Function  
– eastern Germany  
(pooled estimates, 1997-2000; dependent variable: total sales (log Y)) 
   Total  Manufacturing  Services 
Establishment 
Size 
  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21 
    (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
  0.266  0.137 0.222  0.111 0.294  0.154  Works council  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [7.77]*** [2.84]***  [5.25]*** [1.85]*  [5.17]*** [1.98]** 
 1.149  0.237  1.085  -0.143  1.19  0.448  Number of 
employees 
( N log ) 
  [12.57]***  [0.30] [9.89]***  [0.16] [8.43]***  [0.31] 
  -0.096  -0.121 -0.131  -0.242 -0.039  -0.01  Capital stock 
( K log )    [1.42]  [1.00] [1.84]*  [1.19] [0.39]  [0.06] 
  -0.047  0.154 -0.068  0.164 -0.034  0.142  N
2 log  
  [2.07]**  [0.73] [2.22]**  [0.65] [1.01]  [0.38] 
  0.021  0.016 0.016  0.016 0.023  0.013  K
2 log  
  [2.31]**  [1.49] [1.66]*  [0.96] [1.80]*  [0.89] 
  -0.007  0.007 0.01 0.037 -0.023  -0.01  K N log log  
  [0.65]  [0.27] [0.71]  [0.82] [1.53]  [0.32] 
 0.144  0.09  0.123  0.049  0.18  0.162  Investment in ICT 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [6.66]*** [2.81]***  [5.19]*** [1.34]  [4.34]*** [2.76]*** 
  -0.11 -0.093 -0.105  -0.091 -0.107  -0.092  State of technology 
(index: 1= up-to-
date; 5 = very old) 
 
  [7.28]***  [4.07]*** [6.19]***  [3.39]*** [3.89]***  [2.20]** 
  -0.904  -0.963 -1.596  -1.769 -0.557  -0.812  Part-time workers 
(percentage) 
 
  [9.39]***  [6.46]*** [11.59]***  [6.02]*** [4.58]***  [4.78]*** 
  -0.759 -0.732  -0.939 -1.12  -0.418 -0.086  Apprentices 
(percentage) 
 
  [5.48]***  [2.80]*** [6.18]***  [3.69]*** [1.55]  [0.17] 
  0.253  0.295 0.214  0.331 0.235  0.264  Skilled workers 
(percentage) 
 
  [4.99]***  [3.64]*** [3.40]***  [2.77]*** [2.81]***  [2.34]** 
  0.062  0.068 0.046  0.061 0.086  0.08  Collective 
agreement 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
 
  [2.42]**  [1.80]*  [1.73]* [1.36]  [1.67]* [1.16] 
  11.685  13.933 12.052  15.448 11.937  13.144  Constant 
  [39.25]***  [8.14]*** [39.49]***  [7.12]*** [24.23]***  [4.30]*** 
Output elasticities 
at sample means 
           
YN ε     0.881  0.900 0.941  0.904 0.793  0.860 
p-value 
 
  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  0.000 
YK ε     0.118  0.091 0.095  0.082 0.142  0.104 
p-value    [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  0.000 
             
No. of observations    5622  1949  3523  1198  2099  751 
No. of plants    2564  895  1696  593  868  302 
R
2    0.87  0.64 0.90  0.58 0.82  0.71 
Notes: Regressions also include sector and year dummies. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01,. 05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
Table 5:  Works Council Effects on Productivity from OLS Regressions of a  
Translog Production Function, Individual Years  
        1997 1998 1999 2000 Pooled 
N ≥  5    0.259 0.235 0.207 0.238 0.232 
    [5.76]*** [5.92]*** [5.82]*** [7.35]*** [8.88]*** 
    2024 2520 2969 3952 11465 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.123 0.107 0.056 0.172 0.118 
   [1.86]*  [1.94]*  [1.16]  [3.60]***  [3.22]*** 
Total 
    546 734 942 1373  3595 
N ≥  5    0.305 0.172 0.131 0.161 0.177 
    [5.31]*** [3.55]*** [3.31]*** [4.05]*** [5.71]*** 
    1204 1497 1807 2362 6870 
100 ≥  N ≥  21   0.119  0.063  -0.011  0.07  0.046 
   [1.73]*  [0.94]  [-0.18]  [1.22]  [1.03] 
Manu-
facturing 
    291 394 549 753 1987 
N ≥  5    0.212 0.283 0.288 0.291 0.275 
    [2.88]*** [4.46]*** [4.60]*** [5.56]*** [6.31]*** 
    820  1023 1162 1590 4595 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.098 0.145 0.139 0.269 0.183 
   [0.82]  [1.61]  [1.75]*  [3.41]***  [3.05]*** 
Germany 
Services 
    255 340 393 620 1608 
N ≥  5    0.2  0.133 0.227 0.229 0.206 
    [2.83]*** [2.02]**  [3.69]*** [5.15]*** [5.21]*** 
    1003 1234 1373 2233 5843 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.083 -0.039  0.074 0.177 0.098 
   [0.79]  [-0.43]  [0.83]  [2.64]***  [1.80]* 
Total 
    227 310 367 742 1646 
N ≥  5    0.242 0.049 0.101 0.102 0.113 
    [3.16]***  [0.73] [1.52] [1.89]*  [2.59]*** 
    615 727 805 1200  3347 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.073  -0.055 -0.111 -0.038 -0.042 
    [0.58]  [-0.54] [-1.06] [-0.47] [-0.71] 
Manu-
facturing 
    116 155 190 328 789 
N ≥  5    0.191 0.203 0.32  0.306 0.27 
   [1.68]*  [1.82]*  [3.03]***  [4.45]***  [4.14]*** 
    388 507 568 1033  2496 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.076 -0.075  0.215 0.311 0.186 




    111 155 177 414 857 
N ≥  5    0.305 0.304 0.202 0.277 0.266 
    [5.13]*** [6.18]*** [4.83]*** [5.90]*** [7.77]*** 
    1021 1286 1596 1719 5622 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.17  0.198 0.047 0.171 0.137 
   [1.88]*  [2.75]***  [0.81]  [2.54]**  [2.84]*** 
Total 
    319 424 575 631 1949 
N ≥  5    0.338 0.234 0.149 0.233 0.222 
    [4.43]*** [3.62]*** [2.96]*** [3.93]*** [5.25]*** 
   589  770  1002  1162  3523 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.164 0.142 0.038 0.184 0.111 
   [1.89]*  [1.69]*  [0.52]  [2.21]**  [1.85]* 
Manu-
facturing 
    175 239 359 425 1198 
N ≥  5    0.253 0.361 0.241 0.3  0.294 
    [2.54]**  [4.76]*** [3.38]*** [3.93]*** [5.17]*** 
    432 516 594 557 2099 
100 ≥  N ≥  21    0.11  0.242 0.072 0.13  0.154 




    144 185 216 206 751 
Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression. The cell entries give coefficient estimate, t-value, and number 
of observations in the regression. Dependent variable and explanatory variables as in Tables 2 through 4.   32 
Table  6:  Production Frontier Estimates of the Technical Efficiency Estimates of Plants with and without a Works   
Council (WC),1997-2000 
Total Manufacturing  Services 
Without WC  With WC  Without WC  With WC  Without WC  With WC 
 
 
  Med.  Conf. interval  Med.  Conf. interval.  Med.  Conf. interval  Med.  Conf. interval  Med.  Conf. interval  Med.  Conf. interval 
 Total 
N ≥  5  0.016  [0.012, 0.021]  0.068  [0.052, 0.089]  0.021  [0.016, 0.027]  0.091  [0.071, 0.118]  0.013  [0.009, 0.019]  0.044  [0.032, 0.060] 
100 ≥  N ≥  21  0.065  [0.051, 0.082]  0.085  [0.068, 0.107]  0.133  [0.104, 0.170]  0.171  [0.136, 0.215]  0.045  [0.035, 0.056]  0.062  [0.050, 0.078] 
                   
 western  Germany 
N ≥  5  0.011  [0.009, 0.015]  0.067  [0.053, 0.083]  0.012  [0.008, 0.017]  0.071  [0.049, 0.101]  0.011  [0.008, 0.017]  0.054  [0.043, 0.068] 
100 ≥  N ≥  21  0.055  [0.046, 0.068]  0.073  [0.061, 0.089]  0.104  [0.086, 0.125]  0.133  [0.110, 0.162]  0.051  [0.040, 0.066]  0.055  [0.044, 0.068] 
                   
 eastern  Germany 
N ≥  5  0.036  [0.024, 0.052]  0.093  [0.065, 0.131]  0.070  [0.051, 0.095]  0.175  [0.134, 0.229]  0.017  [0.010, 0.029]  0.049  [0.034, 0.070] 
100 ≥  N ≥  21  0.115  [0.090, 0.147]  0.154  [0.121, 0.195]  0.162  [0.121, 0.219]  0.193  [0.147, 0.255]  0.111  [0.085, 0.145]  0.152  [0.112, 0.207] 
Notes: The production frontier estimation is fixed effects, with log total sales as the dependent variable.  
The estimates control for industry effects. Confidence intervals are for the .95 level.Table  7:  OLS Regressions of a Cobb-Douglas Production Function in   
Differences, 1997- 2000 (dependent variable: ∆∆∆∆  log total sales) 
    Total  western Germany  eastern Germany 
   N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21  N ≥  5  100 ≥  N ≥  21 
    (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
            Works council 
(dummy)             
  0.013  -0.012 0.051  -0.004 -0.009  0.016  1997:yes; 2000:yes 
 
 
  [0.45]  [0.26] [1.38]  [0.07] [0.20]  [0.22] 
 0.02  0.143  0.069  -0.007  0.019  0.242  1997:no; 2000:yes 
 
 
  [0.21]  [1.40] [0.54]  [0.07] [0.13]  [1.40] 
  0.159 -0.059  0.041 0.219  0.202 -0.145  1997:yes; 2000:no 
    [1.53] [0.70]  [0.66] [2.78]***  [1.22] [1.42] 
             
  0.622  0.536 0.529  0.306 0.686  0.607  Number of employees 
( N log ∆ ) 
 
 [7.09]*** [5.72]***  [4.52]*** [1.83]*  [6.06]*** [4.87]*** 
  0.014  0.082 0.014  0.082 0.016  0.085  Capital stock 
( K log ∆ ) 
 
  [0.99] [4.08]***  [0.46] [1.43]  [0.84] [3.71]*** 




  [1.31]  [0.76] [0.79]  [0.19] [0.79]  [0.42] 




  [0.02]  [0.64] [2.25]**  [0.15] [0.82]  [0.38] 
  0.136 -0.147  0.037 0.283  0.272 -0.533  Part-time workers 
(∆  percentage) 
 
  [0.64]  [0.95] [0.28]  [1.08] [0.67]  [2.23]** 
  -0.191 -0.426  -0.325 0.057  -0.177 -0.597  Apprentices 
(∆  percentage) 
 
  [0.66]  [1.12] [0.72]  [0.09] [0.46]  [1.11] 
  0.06 0.073  0.09 0.15  0.08 0.061  Skilled workers 
(∆  percentage) 
 
  [0.71] [1.19]  [1.44] [1.66]*  [0.53] [0.67] 
            Collective agreement 
(dummy)             
  0.001  -0.059 -0.068  -0.212 0.042  -0.012  1997:yes; 2000:yes 
 
 
  [0.02] [1.16]  [1.27] [2.68]***  [0.90] [0.17] 
  -0.061 -0.224  -0.094 0.004  -0.032 -0.271  1997:no; 2000:yes 
 
 
  [0.86] [1.97]** [0.80] [0.02]  [0.36] [2.07]** 
  0.028 0.047  -0.075  -0.072  0.061 0.102  1997:yes; 2000:no 
 
 
  [0.57]  [0.84] [1.01]  [0.73] [0.96]  [1.37] 
 -0.066  -0.057          Dummy eastern 
Germany   [2.66]*** 
 
[1.55]        
Constant   -0.232  -0.828  -0.269  0.113  -0.33  -0.803 
  [1.16] [6.09]***  [2.78]***  [0.80]  [1.32] [4.70]***   
           
No. of observations    1098  314  506  126  592  188 
R
2    0.31  0.37 0.3  0.42 0.35  0.44 
Notes:  ∆  denotes the difference between 2000 and 1997 of the respective variable. The regressions 
also include sector dummies. ***, **, * denote significance at the .01. .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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